with Filippo De Marco
· Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 59(7): 3479–3499
(2024)
We show that competition adversely affects information production in the banking industry. The positive abnormal return associated with the announcement of a bank loan is reduced in US states that deregulate interstate branching, and the effect is present only for informationally opaque firms and for banks that rely more on soft information. Charge-off rates on small business loans are higher in deregulated states, suggesting that competition decreases loan quality because it reduces banks' incentives to invest in information.
Published version
Draft (PDF)
with Elena Carletti, Robert Marquez
· Journal of Financial Economics, 136(3): 743–759
(2020)
In a general equilibrium model of bank capital, we show that depositors are likely to bear most of the cost of stricter regulatory capital standards, whereas shareholders may benefit from regulation.
Published version
Draft (PDF)
J. L. Bönsel, M. Maurer, A. Tundis, M. Winstel
· arXiv:2602.17490
(2026)
arXiv
with Johannes Lindner, Marco Massarenti
· Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 1(2): 3–24
(2012)
Published version
F. Menzel, D. Spemann, S. Petriconi, J. Lenzner, T. Butz
· Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research B, 260(1): 419–425
(2007)
Published version
F. Menzel, D. Spemann, S. Petriconi, J. Lenzner, T. Butz
· Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research B, 250(1–2): 66–70
(2006)
Published version
P. Esquinazi, D. Spemann, K. Schindler, R. Höhne, M. Ziese, A. Setzer, K. Han, S. Petriconi, M. Diaconu, H. Schmidt
· Thin Solid Films, 505(1–2): 85–89
(2005)
Published version
S. Cheng, S. Petriconi, S. Pratt et al.
· Physical Review C, 69: 054906
(2004)
Preprint (arXiv)
Published version
S. Pratt, S. Petriconi
· Physical Review C, 68: 054901
(2003)
Preprint (arXiv)
Published version