My research interests are banking theory, fintech, networks and blockchain.


The redistributive effects of bank capital regulation (2020)
(with E. Carletti & R. Marquez) Journal of Financial Economics [link]
In a general equilibrium model of bank capital, we show that depositors are likely to bear most of the cost of stricter regulatory capital standards, whereas shareholders may benefit from regulation.

Working papers

Bank competition, information choice and inefficient lending booms R & R
If loan offers of informed banks can be observed by uninformed competitors, banks will lend excessively and screen too little. More bank competition exacerbates the problem and yields inefficient boom-bust cycles in credit.
NEW: Bank competition and information production (with Filippo De Marco)
We show that competition adversely affects information production in the banking industry. In particular, we observe that the positive abnormal return associated with the announcement of a bank loan is reduced in US states that deregulate interstate branching. The negative effect of competition on information production is present only for informationally opaque firms (i.e., firms with few tangible assets and bank-dependent borrowers) and for banks that rely more on “soft” information (i.e., small banks). Moreover, we find that charge-off rates on small business loans are higher in deregulated states. Our results suggest that competition decreases loan quality because it reduces banks’ incentives to invest in information.
Geeks Bearing Gifts: Competition and Information Sharing in Knowledge-Based Service Industry (with Doh-Shin Jeon)
In a service economy where value is co-created by service providers and customers, a commitment to knowledge sharing with rival firms by means of open source software licensing can incentivize stronger customer collaboration and raise the incumbent’s profitability.